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VAT FRAUD IN THE CUSTOMER CHAIN THE GERMAN PERFECT STORM CASES
Richard T. Ainsworth
German civil and criminal courts have not always agreed over whether to allow a
taxpayer to zero-rate intra-Community supplies when the taxpayer making the supply
knew (or should have known) that his buyer in the other Member State intended to
fraudulently evade VAT as a missing trader. This is no longer the case. Zero-rating of
intra-community supplies is now being denied in German civil and criminal courts.
This paper considers how far Germany appears to be extending the law in this
area. In civil courts a lesser standard of knowledge (should have known) is available. In
some cases this lower standard has proven sufficient to deny zero-rating.1 In 2011 six
cases were heard by the Bundesfinanzhof (German Supreme Tax Court)2 that demonstrate
both (a) the civil court’s adoption of criminal analysis and (b) the development of a
middle ground between actual knowledge and absence of knowledge of fraud in the
customer chain. This middle ground can be seen in cases where dispatching traders
should have known of their customer’s scheme to fraudulently evade VAT.
PRIMARY ANALYSIS
After the December 7, 2010 decision by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) in Criminal Proceedings against R (“R”),3 the Bundesfinanzhof made it

1

There is no agreement on whether or not this lesser (should have known) standard should be applied.
Jochen Meyer-Burow & Ocka Stumm, Recent Developments in German Criminal Law and Their Impact on
VAT Compliance, INT’L. VAT MONITOR (May/June 2011) 161, 165 (indicating that it is “… correct [to]
infer from the ECJ’s judgment in the criminal proceedings against R that the intra-Community supplies of
goods would still be zero rated if the supplier should have known that his contract partners had committed
fraud.”) Meyer-Burow & Stumm at 165, n. 21 observe the conflict in opinion in five further references: (1)
Küffner/vonStreit, Anmerkung zum Urteil des EuGH vom 07.12.2010 – Az.: C-285/09, DStR 2010 [Note to
the Judgment on the ECJ on December 7, 2010], at 2576 and (2) Schenkewitz, Aktuelles zur steuerstrafrechtlichen Behandlung fingierter Ausfuhrlieferungen gem. §6 UStG [Update on criminal tax treatment
fictitious export deliveries], BB 2011, at 350 and 357 (who explain that violation of formal obligations
must not preclude the supplier from applying the zero rate under the case law of the ECJ). (3) Höink,
EuGH-Vorlageverfahren für innergemeinschaftli- che Lieferungen, [ECJ preliminary ruling procedure for
intra-Community supplies] DStR 2010, at 1772; and (4) Sterzinger, Anmerkung zum Urteil des EuGH v.
07.12.2010 - Rs. [Note on the Judgment of the ECJ of December 7, 2010 - Rs] C-285/09”, UR 2011, at 15
(who contends that only “intentional” abuse has the effect that suppliers may lose the right to apply the zero
rate). However, in (5) Die Rechtssache “R” - Der EuGH setzt seine Rechtsprechung zur missbräuchlichen
Erlangung umsatzsteuerlicher Vorteile fort [The Case "R" - The Court Continues its Case Law on
Obtaining Fraudulent Sales Tax Benefits], UStB 2011, at 52 and 55, Hundt-Eßwein disagrees and points to
case law of the ECJ indicating that the supplier’s intentional actions have the effect that he loses the right to
zero rate intra-Community supplies of goods but also the circumstance that he “should have known” about
his customer’s fraud.
2
The Bundesfinanzhof is one of five federal supreme courts in Germany. It takes appeals of only tax and
customs cases that come up from the Finanzgericht (the Finance Courts) which are specialized courts
established in each federal state.
3
Criminal Proceedings against R, ECJ judgment of Dec. 7, 2010, C-285/09 (hereinafter R).
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clear that it would follow the reasoning of the German criminal courts.4 Civil courts have
now denied taxpayers the right to zero-rate dispatches to another Member State, when the
taxpayer knew (or should have known) based on objective factors, that its buyer intended
to use the transfer to fraudulently evade VAT in the other Member State.5
The unfortunate outcome may be that a single transaction can be taxed twice:
once through the denial of the zero-rate on dispatch, and a second time through an
enforcement action in the buyer’s jurisdiction.6 Commentators do not agree that double
taxation is necessary.7 However, the issuance of corrected invoices after a court’s ruling
4

The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice – criminal courts) had previously decided two very
similar criminal cases in the same manner: On November 20, 2008 it decided Case 1 StR 354/08, and on
February 19, 2009 it decided Case 1 StR 633/08. An appeal was brought against the first of these cases
before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), which suspended the prison term that
had been imposed pending a final decision in “R.”
5
German civil and criminal courts were in conflict over the treatment of Mr. R. In this case the German
tax authorities denied Mr. R the right to zero-rate his sale of automobiles to Portugal, and criminal fraud
penalties were imposed. The Landgericht Mannheim (Mannheim regional criminal court of first instance)
upheld the penalties. In doing so, the Landgericht was following a 2008 decision of the Bundesgerichtshof
(Federal Supreme Court).
However, the Finanzgericht (tax court of first instance) and the Bundesfinanzhof saw the matter
differently. According to the civil courts the zero-rate on Mr. R’s intra-Community supply could not be
refused because the requirements for an intra-Community supply were met. The objective conditions set
down in Albert Collée v. Finanzamt Limburg an der Lahn, Case C-146/05 [2007] ECR 1-7861 (September
27, 2007) had been satisfied. Under these conditions zero-rating could only be refused if there was a risk of
loss of tax revenue, or if the levying of VAT was in jeopardy. The civil courts reasoned that any risk of
VAT loss arose in Portugal, not Germany. A zero-rate was therefore appropriate.
6
Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion of Advocate General in Criminal Proceedings against R, Case
C-285/09 delivered June 29, 2010 noted this possibility at 63 & 64 observed:
Accordingly, if Mr. R is refused the exemption and, at the same time, the
Portuguese authorities succeed in collecting the VAT to which they are entitled, it would
create a situation of double taxation which would also be contrary to the principle of
neutrality.
In its question, the Bundesgerichtshof states that that double taxation may be
avoided if the German authorities refund the collected VAT to Mr. R when it is
established that tax has already been paid on the same transaction in Portugal. I consider,
however, that that refund mechanism (provided for in Paragraph 227 of the AO) does not
serve to prevent double taxation, but only to remedy its effects once it has occurred.
Accordingly, it seems insufficient to safeguard the principle of neutrality of the tax.
7
Meyer-Burow & Stumm, supra note 1, at 165 observes:
In its judgment in the criminal proceedings against R, the ECJ has indicated that,
inasmuch as the supplier’s involvement in the evasion is a decisive factor, refusing to
allow the supplier to zero rate the intra-Community supply would lead to double taxation
of the transactions concerned. However, the ECJ has not fully clarified whether double
taxation is an inevitable consequence of the refusal to apply the zero rate. For example, it
may be possible for the German supplier to issue corrected VAT invoices that mention
German VAT, which the customers could recover under the VAT refund procedure or,
depending on the circumstances, deduct through their periodic VAT returns. It could be
argued that, provided that the Portuguese car dealers show that they have paid the VAT
due in Portugal, the German tax authorities should not be allowed to reject the car
dealers’ applications for refund of the German VAT charged to them on the corrected invoices. Refunding the German VAT to the Portuguese car dealers would, under those
circumstances, be required by the neutrality principle of the VAT system. VAT should
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could easily be time-barred. In addition, an input tax deduction could be prohibited if the
taxpayer’s conduct has been shown to be in “bad faith,” or if there is a high “risk of
revenue loss.”8
This is an aggressive approach to combating missing trader fraud. There do not
appear to be comparable efforts in other Member States.
Two elements of the German cases considered here are noteworthy. First, these
are cases that involve fraud in the customer chain rather than the more typical fraud in the
supply chain – in other words these cases look forward to fraud in future transactions,
rather than backwards at fraud in historical transactions. Secondly, the questions in these
six cases involve the denial of a zero rate on an intra-community supply rather than the
more common denial of a deduction on a domestic purchase.
AN ALTERNATE ANALYSIS
Instead of just considering the interplay of German criminal and civil law in these
cases it is possible to see them as part of a constellation of court decisions orbiting the
CJEU’s reasoning in two sets of joined cases: Alex Kittel v. Belgium and Belgium v.
Recolta Recycling SPRL (Kittel/Recolta),9 and Mahagében kft v. Nemzeti Adó-és
Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága and Péter Dávid v. Nemzeti
Adó-és Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága (Mahagében/Dávid).10
These are supply-side (input deduction denial), not customer-side (zero-rate denial) cases,
but they have been instrumental in developing the law around missing trader fraud.
Kittel/Recolta denies domestic input deductions when a missing trader is the
taxpayer’s supplier; Mahagében/Dávid expressly extends this analysis throughout the
purchase chain. The six German cases following “R” are similar. They deny zero-rating
when the missing trader is a customer, but the case law does not (yet) extend throughout
the customer chain.11 The linchpin binding all of these cases together is the question
about the degree of knowledge – do we need actual knowledge of fraud or can the
knowledge element be reduced to something the taxpayer should have known, or ought to
have known before a tax advantage can be denied?12
not be used as an instrument to penalize offences by unnecessarily assessing VAT twice
on the same transactions.
8
Judgment of CJEU of May 8, 2008 in the joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07, Esctrade SpA v. Agenzia
delle Entrate – Ufficio de Genova 3 (indicating that the right to deduct is not time-barred when a tax
authority assesses a taxpayer for inadvertently failing to perform a reverse charge at a time when the fouryear period for assessments was open even though the two-year period for deduction had closed, provided
the error was not the result of bad faith or evasion and there was no risk of tax loss).
9
CJEU judgment of 6 July 2006, Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 [2006] ECR 1-6161.
10
Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11.
11
However, an express extension of this effort into the full customer chain is only a matter of time.
Consider the four permutations of this fraud in the used car sector outlined by the Portuguese tax auditor
Sandra Luzia Assunçã Rocha. It would be a simple matter of inserting a “buffer” between then importer
and the missing trader, if the rule was otherwise. See infra notes 19, 20, 21, and 22.
12
Should have known is the expression used in Kittel/Recolta whereas ought to have known is the
expression in Mahagében/Dávid. They are linguistic synonyms. Substituting one expression for the other
would not be a significant matter, if a dispute had not developed over the meaning of should have known in
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From a tax policy perspective Kittel/Recolta, Mahagében/Dávid, “R,” and the six
German cases present three basic questions: (1) does it matter when the fraud occurs
(earlier, on the purchase-side of the taxpayer’s supply chain, or later, on the sale-side of
the taxpayer’s customer chain13); (2) does it matter where the fraud arises (domestically
or in another Member State14); and (3) does it matter which VAT benefit is denied to the
fraudster as a remedy (the right of deducting input VAT, or the right to zero-rate an intracommunity supply15)?
The answer in each instance appears to be: “No.” It does not matter when, or
where the fraud occurs, or which benefit [deduction or zero-rating] is denied the taxpayer.
The evaluative standard is the same: did the taxpayer know or should he have known,
based on objective factors, that his transaction was connected with fraudulent evasion of
VAT? If so, benefits may be curtailed.
Stated in terms of the Perfect Storm, this analysis of the six German cases is
considered in the section entitled Kittel Stage 3: The Search for Assets.16
Criminal Proceedings against R, Case C-285/09
The facts in “R” are not unusual. The EU has a considerable problem with VAT
fraud in the second-hand car market. Sandra Luzia Assunçã Rocha,17 a tax auditor with
the Portuguese Directorate-General for Taxation recently sketched the details of four of
the most common methods employed by fraudsters in the used car sector:18 (a) the chain
fraud model,19 (b) traditional fake triangular operations model,20 (c) the use of multiple
Kittel/Recolta. An effort was made (most notably in UK litigation) to significantly restrict this term so that
it narrowly meant could not have helped but to have known. These arguments are based in how to translate
the French expression aurait dû savoir used in the official “language of the case.” For an extended
discussion of the interrelationship of Kittel/Recolta and Mahagében/Dávid see Richard T. Ainsworth,
Mahagében kft & Péter Dávid: Re-directing the EU VAT’s Perfect Storm, XX TAX NOTES INT’L XX (JULY
X, 2012)
13
Kittel/Recolta and Mahagében/Dávid are purchase-side cases. “R” is a sales-side case.
14
Mahagében/Dávid is a purely domestic case with the fraud arising domestically. Both Kittel/Recolta and
“R” involve cross-border trades, but the Kittel/Recolta fraud arises domestically, whereas the fraud in “R”
occurs in the other Member State.
15
Kittel/Recolta and Mahagében/Dávid are concerned with the denial of the right of deduction. “R” is
concerned with denial of a zero-rate.
16
Richard T. Ainsworth, A Perfect Storm in the EU VAT: Kittel, R, and MARC, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L. 849,
861-2 (May 28, 2012).
17
For the past seven years Ms. Assunçã Rocha has been a member of a specialized team of auditors
investigating second-hard car fraud. In an effort to convey the scope of this fraud the figures for one recent
case are reproduced. It involved 2,729,465€ in car sales that were effectively sold tax-free. The cars came
from five Member States, and passed through a Portuguese “buffer company” before being sold on to
Spanish traders and final consumers as well as Danish traders. The audit period spanned three months from
August 2, 2010 through November 8, 2010.
18
Sandra Luzia Assunçã Rocha, VAT Fraud in the Car Sector, 28 TAX TRIBUNE 59-62 (2011).
19
The chain fraud model involves two Member States. Invoices are sent to a buffer enterprise (missing
trader) that engages in a margin sale to a third enterprise (to whom the cars are drop-shipped) and who then
sells on to a final consumer in the same Member State.
20
The fake triangular operation model involves three Member States. Under this scheme the buffer is
placed in the third Member State, and the cars are shipped to a trader in another Member State who
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buffer companies in multiple Member States,21 and (d) the use of fake purchase
invoices.22 The facts in “R” indicate that a combination of the methods mention at (a)
and (d) were used by Mr. R.
Facts. Mr. R, a Portuguese national, managed a German company trading in
luxury cars. More than 500 vehicles were sold each year. Most of the buyers were
automobile distributors in Portugal.
In 2002 Mr. R began manipulating records to conceal the true identity of his
purchasers. This deception enabled his buyers to evade audit detection. For German
purposes Mr. R declared that his sales were exempt intra-Community supplies. Mr. R
recorded these supplies as VAT-free transactions on annual VAT returns. To support the
German return Mr. R prepared false invoices. These invoices were drafted in the name of
real businesses, with correct addresses and VAT ID numbers, but the businesses were not
the true purchasers. Frequently these businesses did not know that their identities had
been stolen. False shipping documents were also prepared indicating that shipments were
made to the false buyers.
For Portuguese purposes a different set of invoices were prepared. This time the
sales were represented as used car sales, taxable under the margin scheme. The false
paperwork made it appear that these transactions were already taxed in Germany. If a
final consumer was known before delivery, Mr. R produced:
 Vehicle registration documents in the name and address of the final consumer
indicating that this was a sale of a used vehicle, and
 A (false) notation was inscribed on the invoice: “taxation of profit margin
pursuant to ¶25a of the UStG.”
Criminal courts. After audit the German tax authorities denied Mr. R the right to
zero-rate his sales. Criminal fraud penalties were imposed, and the Landgericht
Mannheim (Mannheim regional criminal court of first instance) upheld the tax
administration’s determination. Mr. R was sentenced to a three-year prison term for tax
fraud.23 The Landgericht Mannheim determined that the falsified sales to Portugal were
not intra-Community supplies within the meaning of the Sixth Directive. In reaching its
decision the Landgericht followed a 2008 case of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal
Supreme Court).24
effectuates a sale to the final consumer. The sale between the buffer and the trader is a margin sale. The
buffer can become a missing trader.
21
The multiple buffer companies in multiple Member States method uses a number of margin scheme sales
between buffers, while the cars are transported directly to the end trader who then makes the final sale to a
domestic consumer.
22
The fake purchase invoice method has the car invoiced to a trader in a third Member State. The car
however is actually shipped to a different trader in another Member States, and arrives with a registration
certificate of a specific individual (purportedly the former owner). This individual is named as the seller on
a fake invoice that is held on file by the trader receiving the cars. With this documentation the trader then
sells the car under a margin scheme to a business that sells on to the final consumer.
23
“R,”at ¶22.
24
Judgment of the First Criminal Chamber of the Bundesgerichtshof of 20 November 2008, No. BGH 1
StR 354/08 (in German, translation on file with author).
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Civil courts. This was not the way that the Finanzgericht (tax court of first
instance) and the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Supreme Court for Tax Matters) saw the
matter.25 According to the civil courts the zero-rate on Mr. R’s intra-Community supply
could not be refused. The cars were sold and actually dispatched to Portugal. As a result
the requirements for an intra-Community supply were met.
The civil courts reasoned that the objective conditions set down in Albert Collée
v. Finanzamt Limburg an der Lahn,26 had been met. Under these conditions, a zero-rate
can only be refused if there is a risk of loss of tax revenue, or if the levying of VAT is in
jeopardy. Any risk of loss arises in Portugal, not Germany, thus it is Portugal’s
obligation (not Germany’s) to enforce the rules.
In light of the Bundesfinanzhof’s opinion, the Bundesgerichtshof asked the CJEU
if a taxpayer should be denied use of a zero rate, if on the basis of objective evidence it is
established that the taxpayer knew that, by his supply, he was participating in a
transaction aimed at evading VAT, or if he took actions aimed at concealing the true
identity of the person to whom the goods were supplied in order to enable the latter
person or a third person to evade VAT?
ECJ decision. The ECJ determined that when a taxpayer prepares deliberately
fraudulent invoices, declarations, and engages in substantial manipulation of evidence in
support of an intra-Community supply, a Member State is required to refuse the zerorate.
In other words, the ECJ agrees with the German criminal courts. The proper way
to look at this case is not German-centric (how should the German tax authority respond
to Mr. R’s fraud in their duty to protect the German fisc). The correct perspective is
Euro-centric (how should any Member State respond to Mr. R’s fraud to protect the
“proper functioning of the [Community’s] common system of VAT.”27)
Six German Cases
This section considers six German civil cases from 2011 that involved the
question of denying a zero-rate for an intra-community supply. The cases are organized
by trial date at the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Supreme Court for Tax Matters): two cases
were heard on February 17, 2011 (V R 28/10 and V R 30/10),28 one on May 12, 2011 (V
25

Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of 29 July 2009, No. BFH, XI B 24/09 (in German, translation on file
with author); “R,”at ¶23.
26
Albert Collée as full legal successor to Collée KG v. Finanzamt Limburg an der Lahn, Case C-146/05
[2007] ECR 1-7861 (27 September 2007).
27
“R,”at ¶48. Emblematic of this shift in focus is apparent in the citations. Where the Bundesgerichtshof
specifically asks about Art. 28c(A)(a) [VAT Directive 138(1)] the ECJ directs most of its attention to the
heading, Art.28c(A) [VAT Directive 131].
28
The Bundesfinanzhof published these judgments simultaneously (February 17, 2011) in an effort to “…
clarify … a number of controversial issues regarding so-called intra-Community supplies to businesses in
other member States, in particular issues of fraudulent use of sales tax exemption for delivery transactions
within the European Union.” Press Release of the Bundesfinanzhof, No. 51 of 13 July 201, VAT on intra-
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R 46/10), and three on August 11, 2011 (V R 50/09, V R 3/10 and V R 19/10). Heach
case was on appeal from a tax court of first instance, Finanzgericht. Facts of the separate
cases will be considered first, aggregate analysis will follow.
(1) V R 28/10.29 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Supreme
Court for Tax Matters) on appeal from the Tax Court (Finanzgericht) of Baden
Württemberg. It is one of the two related cases heard on February 17, 2011.
V R 28/10 concerns the delivery of luxury cars (Mercedes A 170) in a purported
triangular transaction.30 The cars are sold to three traders in Italy, and then re-sold to
Italian consumers. Each trader authorized the same German resident to act as its
representative for securing cars.31 The reality of the relationship was reversed. It was the
“agent” who in fact controlled (and created) the traders.32 German auto suppliers were
asked to sell cars to the traders, but deliver them directly to final consumers.33 The
traders did not file Italian VAT returns.34
The German tax authority denied the supplier’s zero-rate. The Finanzgericht
agreed and decided against the supplier based on a failure to comply with formal
documentation requirements.35 The Bundesfinanzhof however, rejected this formalistic
approach. It indicated that the case should instead turn on the supplier’s knowledge.36
The Bundesfinanzhof remanded the case to the Finanzgericht with the instruction
that the decision needed to conform to the CJEU’s decision in “R,” C-285/09.37 The
Finanzgericht was told to determine if the German supplier had determined the true
buyer’s identity (the final consumers).38

Community Supplies in the Internal Market, available at: http://juris.bundesfinanzhof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bfh&Art=pm&Datum=2011&nr=24053&linked=pm
29
BFH, judgment of February 17, 2011 – V R 28/10 (FG Baden Württemberg May 20, 2010 12 K247/06).
30
Id., ¶28.
31
Id., ¶1.
32
Id., ¶11.
33
Id., ¶2.
34
Id., ¶11 (Italian audit investigation indicated that the traders were “economically non-existent
customers).
35
Id., ¶¶5, 7 & 9 Indicating that there were problems with the CRM bills being adequate evidence of
dispatch if not properly filled out, a signature, vehicle identification numbers and a confirmation receipt in
addition to the fact that delivery was made to the final consumers without good evidence of the person to
whom they were delivered. However, this data is not required. Id., ¶¶23, 24, 25 &29.
36
The decision does not have a clear discussion of a “should have known” standard. Even though mention
is made of a “diligence of the prudent businessman” standard, the case seems binary – either there is
knowledge or there is none.
37
Id., ¶38.
38
Id., ¶16 (referencing the personal identity requirements of §6a Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 Buchst. a & b, Nr. 3
UStG. These requirements mandate that the supplier know to whom he is making his delivery, because it is
this person who will assume the responsibility for the VAT in the destination state – Italy. These are
requirements that the Bundesfinanzhof specifically associates with the CJEU decision in “R” at ¶15 &
headnote in that decision and ¶38 herein).
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The result of the remand is a foregone conclusion. The purpose of the
arrangement was for the “agent” to establish Italian (missing) traders to disguise the
identity of the true buyers.39 Did the suppliers know?
The Bundesfinanzhof indicated that if (after exercising the diligence of a prudent
businessman) the supplier had a genuine belief in the validity of the three-way
transaction, and if the supplier had taken all reasonable precautions to ascertain his
customer’s identities, then an intra-Community supply was appropriate and the supplier
could not be held liable for the fraud.40
If however, the supplier was aware of the fraud then “R” indicates that the real
buyers were the Italian consumers.41 The fictitious sales to the traders should be ignored.
The transactions would be taxable in Germany (and the zero-rate would ne denied).
(2) V R 30/10.42 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof on appeal from the
Finanzgericht of Saarlandes. This is the companion case heard together with V R 28/10
on February 17, 2011.
V R 30/10 involves a traditional carousel fraud in cell phones. The German
supplier sold phones to Austrian customers who re-sold them to other Austrian taxpayers.
The phones were eventually re-exported to Germany, and ultimately back to the original
supplier who once again sold then onward to the Austrian buyer. Italian entities were
also involved, and a single managing director of controlled each of the entities in the
carousel.43
As with V R 28/10 the immediate VAT loss was not in Germany - Austrian VAT
was lost in this case. Nevertheless, German tax authorities denied the German supplier’s
zero-rate. The Finanzgericht agreed, and based its decision on the “… known
involvement of a board member of the companies in a ‘VAT carousel.’”44
The Bundesfinanzhof disagreed. It set aside the judgment and remanded the case
to the Finanzgericht with instructions that “mere involvement in a VAT carousel” was
not sufficient to deny the zero-rate on an intra-community supply.45

39

Id., ¶8 (this is the point where the inadequacy of the CRM notes crosses the analysis of the
Bundesfinanzhof. The CRMs did not indicate a specific delivery location, just a city (the billing address
was the address of the traders, but the cars were not delivered there). The name and address of the final
customers were not preserved, nor were the vehicle identification numbers available. The shipping
confirmations were provided with unknown signatures.
40
The Bundesfinanzhof is clear at ¶37 that if the supplier is deceived by “… incorrect information provided
by the purchaser and the contractor cannot recognize the falsity of that information … then the exemption
may legitimately be granted.”
41
Id., ¶18.
42
BFH, judgment of February 17, 2011 – V R 30/10 (FG des Saarlandes, June 30, 2010 1 K 1319/07) EFG
2010, 1740.
43
Id., ¶1.
44
Id., ¶3.
45
Id., ¶10.
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As in V R 28/10 the Bundesfinanzhof once again emphasized that under §6a Abs.
1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 Buchst. a & b, Nr. 3 UStG the supplier must know to whom he is making
his delivery.46 In this case the Bundesfinanzhof is even clearer about why this is
important, and why it places considerable reliance on the CJEU’s “R” decision. The
Bundesfinanzhof notes that in “R” it had,
… requested a preliminary decision [from the CJEU] on whether a tax
exemption [can be] denied on an actual Community supply, if it is
ascertained, that the taxable seller either "knew that with the delivery of
goods he was involved in a transaction which is created to evade tax "or"
did acts that were aimed to conceal the true identity of the purchaser to
allow this or any third party to evade tax.
The ECJ ruled that intra-Community supplies are taxable if the conditions
of an intra-Community supply, although objectively accurate, are
"deliberately factually incorrect" [such as where] bills are issued that
"disguise the identity of the real purchaser" [ECJ judgment R at ¶47, 49
and holding] …47
The Bundesfinanzhof places considerable emphasis on the second part of the
question it posed to the CJEU. It is very concerned with “acts that were aimed to conceal
the true identity of the purchaser to allow this or any third party to evade tax.” German
law makes the same point. §6a Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 Buchst. a & b, Nr. 3 UStG requires
the supplier to know his buyer. This is a standard that is somewhat lesser than actual
knowledge – the criterion on the first part of the disjunctive (“or”) question posed to the
CJEU.
Acts aimed to conceal are clearly apparent in V R 30/10 (the carousel in cell
phones is clearly set out), and they are also part of the case in V R 28/10 (false invoices
sent to “paper” traders set up by the supposed German “agent” of these traders). Finding
these acts of this nature is akin to turning a blind eye to the fraud. This is not proof of the
taxpayer’s actual knowledge, but it is proof of knowledge that the taxpayer should have.
(3) V R 46/10.48 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof on appeal from the
Finanzgericht of Rheinland-Pfalz on May 12, 2011.
VR 46/10 is largely about “other obligations to prevent evasion” that Member
States may impose under the former Article 22(8) of the Sixth Directive [Article 273 of
the current VAT Directive].49 V R 30/10 and V R 28/10 were primarily concerned with
46

Id., ¶15, Indicating that the identity of the purchaser is of crucial importance for the tax exemption for
intra-Community supply, since intra-Community supply and intra-Community acquisition are "one and the
same economic process." The purpose of an intra-Community transaction is to shift tax revenue to the
Member State of final consumption, which is where the goods are delivered: citing: Teleos and Others v.
HMRC, Case C-409/04 [2007] ECR 1-7797 at ¶¶23f, 36, 37 & 41. Twoh International v. Staatsscretaris
van Financiën, Case C-184/05 [2007] ECR 1-7897, at ¶22.
47
Id., ¶¶22 & 23 (emphasis added).
48
BFH, judgment of May 12, 2011 – V R 46/10 (FG Rheinland-Pfalz, October 14, 2010 6 K 1644/08).
49
Article 273 of the VAT Directive reads:
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§6a Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 Buchst. a & b, Nr. 3 UStG, the domestic law requirement that a
German supplier know his buyer. V R 46/10 references other requirements:
 In particular, §14(4) UStG which requires that the VAT-free status of an intracommunity supply be indicated on the invoice, and
 The series of rules in §17a ff UStDV (the VAT Implementation Order) that
specifies verification duties (frequently called “book evidence” documents) like
transportation documents that will show the dispatch of goods.
Generally speaking, at §17a ¶2, No.1 & No. 4 UStDV, Germany requires a very
thoroughly preserved audit trail.
In V R 46/10 an Italian buyer agrees to purchase, pick-up and then transport to his
location in Italy thirteen high-end used cars from a German supplier. The buyer has
authorized his son to complete the transfer. The warrant presented to the supplier is
questionable. It is barely legible, and composed in bad German.50 The son arrives with a
car transporter, makes full payment in cash, and provides a receipt made out on the
letterhead of a different business.51 The receipt indicates that Italy is the destination of
the vehicles, but it omits any mention of the specific place of destination, and the identity
of the consignee.52
Nevertheless, the German supplier issues an invoice (made out to the presumed
Italian purchaser).53 The invoice does not show VAT, but gives no indication why the
sale should be exempt.54 Efforts were allegedly made by the supplier to determine the
identity of the Italian business. What he should have found should have raised additional
concerns. The Italian purchaser had never dealt in automobiles before and had no
facilities to display them.55 The question raised by V R 46/10 is: Did the supplier meet
the “… obligations which [Germany] deems necessary to ensure the correct collection of
VAT and to prevent evasion?”
An auditor, like Sandra Luzia Assunçã Rocha, would be suspicious. Are these
cars actually being delivered to Italy? Could this be the first stage of a MITC chain
fraud56 (where an Italian buyer is simply a buffer re-selling at a low margin)? Or perhaps

Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary to ensure the
correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion, subject to the requirement of equal
treatment as between domestic transactions and transactions carried out between Member
States by taxable persons and provided that such obligations do not, in trade between
Member States, give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.
The option under the first paragraph may not be relied upon in order to impose additional
invoicing obligations over and above those laid down in Chapter 3.
50
Id., ¶3.
51
Id., ¶1.
52
Id., ¶3 (in at least one instance it was reasonably clear that the automobile was not destined for Italy)
53
Id., ¶22.
54
Id., ¶¶18 & 20 (there was no indication of vehicle delivery, tax ID of the buyer, or indication of
exemption reason; UStG §§ 14 & 14a; UStG §25a; UStDV §17a ¶2).
55
Id., ¶1 (confirmed by the Italian tax administration).
56
Supra note 19.
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this is the first leg of a fake triangular MTIC fraud57 (where an Italian buffer facilitates a
margin sale in a third Member State). A multiple buffer company MTIC fraud is equally
possible,58 as is a fraud using fake purchase invoices.59
Is the German seller justified in assuming that this transaction is exempt?60 No.
The Bundesfinanzhof agrees with the Finanzgericht. The supplier’s zero-rate is not
justified. The Bundesfinanzhof indicates that the German supplier should have known
that moving forward with its transaction (given the documentation problems he
encountered) would be risky as there is objective evidence that this transaction might be
involved in fraud. The Bundesfinanzhof states:
The plaintiff therefore has not taken all reasonable measures to prevent an
objective involvement in tax evasion, without that a subjective evaluation
of compliance is difficult to confirm.61
Thus, V R 46/10 is similar to V R 30/10 and V R 28/10. The primary difference
is actual knowledge of fraud verses should have known about potential fraud. A single
person controlled (or managed) all the entities in V R 30/10 and V R 28/10. That was not
the case in V R 46/10, but the German supplier should have known better than to move
forward without better evidence.
(4) V R 50/09.62 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof on appeal from the
Finanzgericht of Baden Württemberg. It was one of three heard on August 11, 2011.
V R 50/09 replicates the decisional history of “R.” A German partnership
delivered luxury cars to addresses in Italy where the actual recipients were automobile
dealers, but the invoices were drafted in the name of Italian import traders as intracommunity supplies.63
The traders did not report the intra-community acquisitions, and the partnership
destroyed most of its records to prevent audit follow-up.64 The cover-up was
unsuccessful, criminal proceeding were initiated for tax evasion, where a full confession
and guilty plea resulted in a two-year suspended sentence.65 Because the partnership had
falsely declared the names of their customers the requirements for an intra-community

57

Supra note 20.
Supra note 21.
59
Supra note 22.
60
Supra note 48, at ¶29 (the court suggests that the taxpayer commit to pay the tax at a later time if the
evidence upon which he is basing his exemption proves to be erroneous).
61
Id., ¶31.
62
BFH, judgment of August 11, 2011 – V R 46/10 (FG Baden Württemberg, November 12, 2009 12 K
273/04 (EFG 2010, 673).
63
Id., ¶2.
64
Id., ¶6 (indicating also that the supplier colluded with the Italian buyer to obscure the buyers with fake
interim acquisitions, imports and billings as well as conducting most transactions in cash to make them
hard to trace).
65
Id., ¶3 (the court noted that this fraud was “a widespread illegal business practice” in Italy) and ¶5
(discussing ht full confession and admission of guilt).
58

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2109499

Richard T. Ainsworth
Customer Chain MTIC – German cases
16 July 2012

supply were not met and German VAT was due on all sales. The tax office assessed the
partnership after the trial.66
The partnership appealed on the grounds that proof of actual delivery to VATregistered businesses could be demonstrated, and the fact that an incorrect name was used
on the invoice should be an immaterial (minor) error. The tax evasion (which was
proven and admitted) was entirely in Italy.67
The Finanzgericht of Baden Württemberg upheld the assessments. The
Bundesfinanzhof determined that the taxpayer’s appeal was “… without merit and
therefore rejected. The [automobile] deliveries of the applicant are not exempt intraCommunity supplies.”68
The Bundesfinanzhof expressly references the authority of Member States to
establish conditions on exemptions under Article 273 to prevent “evasion, avoidance or
abuse.”69 It then couples this authority with express language from “R” and Collée
indicating that even when objective evidence would support a zero-rate, “false invoices,
providing incorrect information and other manipulations of the correct collection of
VAT” can pre-empt its exercise.70
Just as in “R” the partnership in V R 50/09 was “involved willfully in a tax fraud
[by] … concealing the identity of the real purchaser, to enable it to evade tax.”71 Thus,
even though there was a split between the German criminal and civil courts on this issue,
after the CJEU’s decision in “R” it is no longer acceptable to zero-rate an intercommunity supply that contributes to VAT fraud in another Member State.
(5) V R 3/10.72 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof on appeal from the
Finanzgericht of Nürnberg. It is the second of three cases heard on August 11, 2011.
In V R 3/10 a German motor car dealer is selling a car to a Spanish dealer who resells the car to a French final consumer. The Spanish dealer sends a driver to pick up the
car in Germany with instructions to drive it to the end customer in France without the
knowledge of the German dealer.
The German dealer is under an honest (but mistaken) belief that the car is being
taken to the buyer in Spain. In addition the dealer took all appropriate precautions to

66

Id., ¶13 (the assessment was for four years: 2000 for €373,102.02; 2001 for €654,157.32; 2002 for
€618,896.23; and 2003 for €254,957.77).
67
Id., ¶3.
68
Id., ¶16.
69
Id., ¶20.
70
Id., ¶¶20-22 (“R” at supra note 3 at ¶¶ 15 & 46; Collée at supra note 26 at ¶31).
71
Id., ¶24 (referencing “R” at supra note 3 at ¶¶ 48-55).
72
BFH, judgment of August 11, 2011 – V R 3/10 (FG Nürnberg, October 11, 2009 2 K 1696/2008) DStRE
2010, 1389.
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establish the Spanish buyer’s identity and VAT status.73 He did not know, and had no
means of knowing that the car had been re-sold before it was picked up.74 He did not
know and had no reason to know that the car was being redirected to France. The
Spanish buyer had drafted the invoice. The invoice showed no VAT, and indicated that
the reason was because this was an intra-community supply.75
The tax authority contended that because the car was re-sold to a French end
consumer before it was picked up in Germany, that the German dealer had in fact made a
domestic sale to the Spanish dealer (which was subject to German VAT) and that it was
the Spanish dealer who had made a zero-rated intra-community supply to the French
buyer.76
The Finanzgericht held for the taxpayer, and so did the Bundesfinanzhof on
appeal. There was no reason for the German suspect anything other than a normal intracommunity supply was taking place.77 The German dealer had complied with all
documentation requirements, and had otherwise no reason to know of the deception by
the Spanish dealer.78 V R 3/10 stands for the proposition that just because the taxpayer’s
“reliable proof” is wrong does not prevent a zero-rate,79 particularly if there is no
evidence that the taxpayer, “… has obscured the true identity of the purchaser to enable
them to evade tax.”80
(6) V R 19/10.81 This case was heard by the Bundesfinanzhof on appeal from the
Finanzgericht of Niedersächsisches. It is the third of three cases heard on August 11,
2011.
The tax fraud in V R 19/10 is very clearly set out. A German resident is the
managing director and sole shareholder of both a German and Dutch private (limited

73

Id., ¶1 the taxpayer confirmed with the Federal Central Tax Office on the same day that it receive the
FAX order from the Spanish Dealer the tax ID, the name, location postal code and street address of the
buyer).
74
Id., ¶¶1 & 8 (The court indicates that the person who picked up the car was French, but the drive
presented an affidavit of receipt for the vehicle indicating that the vehicle was being taken to Spain, and
presented a written power of attorney issued by the Spanish buyer. The German dealer also made a copy of
the driver’s identity card. The court also found nothing unusual in the appearance of a French driver,
because the Spanish dealer was located on the Franco-Spanish border.)
75
Id., ¶1.
76
Id., ¶5.
77
Id., ¶18 (the situation would be different if the Spanish dealer had announced the French sale “prior to
the transport or dispatch,” citing CJEU judgment of December 16, 2010 in Euro Tyre Holding, Case C430/09).
78
Id., ¶11 & 21 (referencing Article 28c(A) of the Sixth Directive; Article 131 of the current VAT
Directive, and the power of attorney given to the German dealer also represented that the Spanish dealer
was receiving the dispatch of the car).
79
Id., ¶27 citing Albert Collée as full legal successor to Collée KG v. Finanzamt Limburg an der Lahn,
Case C-146/05 [2007] ECR 1-7861 (27 September 2007) at ¶31.
80
Id., ¶28 citing Criminal Proceedings against R, ECJ judgment of Dec. 7, 2010, C-285/09 at headnote.
81
BFH, judgment of August 11, 2011 – V R 3/10 (FG Niedersächsisches, April 29, 2010 16 K 10297/07)
EFG 2010, 1930.
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liability) company (a GmbH, and a BV). The BV owns 99% of a French subsidiary
(SARL).82 The SARL identifies retail customers seeking to purchase automobiles.83
When the SARL locates a customer it notifies an independent Spanish car dealer
with whom a purchase/sale agreement had been worked out that allows the dealer a
margin of €500.84 The dealer then purchases the vehicle from the GmbH,85 and declares
that the car is being brought to Spain.86 Instead the car is delivered directly to the final
consumer in the name of the SARL. The GmbH declares the transaction a tax-free intracommunity supply.87
The GmbH registers the cars in Germany before the sale, and the Spanish dealer
invoices the SARL on the margin scheme for second-hand cars. No acquisition tax is
declared or paid in Spain or in France on the cars.88 Under Sandra Luzia Assunçã
Rocha’s classifications this is a fake triangular operation.89 A buffer is employer in a
third Member State (Spain) to convert the intra-community sale to the margin scheme, so
that the trader (SARL) can sell to the final consumer on margin.
Through its managing director the GmbH has full knowledge of the entire
customer chain. It not only knew that the Spanish dealer would not bring the vehicles to
Spain, it knew of the improper use of the margin scheme and the avoidance of VAT in
Spain and France.
Relying on the recent CJEU decision in “R,” the Bundesfinanzhof overturns the
decision of the Finanzgericht and upholds the determination of the tax authority. In spite
of satisfying necessary “objective conditions,”90 a transaction is taxable if “… accounting
records [are used to] obscure the identity of the purchaser and thereby allow the
avoidance of the VAT.91
CONCLUSION
Assessing the German Cases
The CJEU’s decision in “R” not only (a) harmonizes the approach of the German
civil and criminal courts on the denial of a supplier’s zero-rate if a supplier makes an
intra-community supply with actual knowledge that his buyer will use the transfer to
evade VAT in another Member State, but it also (b) provides an avenue for extending
enforcement into cases where the supplier has less than actual knowledge of this fraud.

82

Id., ¶2.
Id., ¶6 (in all cases except two where Dutch consumers were involved, the final customers were French).
84
Id., ¶3.
85
Id., ¶¶3-8.
86
Id., ¶7 (insurance was purchased indicating that the car would be brought to Barcelona, Spain).
87
Id., ¶8 (indicating that the only reason for including the Spanish entity in the customer chain was to
simulate intra-community supplies, because otherwise it’s presence was “nonsensical).
88
Id., ¶¶14 & 35.
89
Supra note 20.
90
Id., ¶¶24 - 35.
91
Id., ¶22, citing Criminal Proceedings against R, ECJ judgment of Dec. 7, 2010, C-285/09 at ¶46.
83
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The narrow facts of “R” present a taxpayer who has (a) actual knowledge of his
buyer’s fraud, but who also takes (b) affirmative steps to facilitate the fraud by drafting
false invoices, shipping documents, and German car registrations for identified end
consumers.
These narrow facts generate the question that the CJEU was asked. The
Bundesfinanzhoft takes particular note that the question, and the answer in “R” is
disjunctive - whether the taxpayer “… knew that with the delivery of goods he was
involved in a transaction which is created to evade tax "or" did acts that were aimed to
conceal the true identity of the purchaser to allow this or any third party to evade tax.”
The first clause references actual knowledge of fraud, the second references a
lesser standard. It asks about affirmative acts that facilitate fraud, and which actually
result in tax evasion by the customer, or a customer’s customer in the purchase chain.
This is not knowledge of the fraud; it is knowledge that a supplier should have as a
reasonable businessman when he considers the consequences of his actions.
The second clause then, presents a should have known standard rooted in
objective conditions expressly adopted under German statute and Article 273 of the VAT
Directive to prevent “evasion, avoidance or abuse.”
The knowledge element in the six cases. These cases present a full range of
knowledge analysis. In three cases V R 28/10, V R 30/10 and V R 19/10 actual
knowledge of the fraud is easy to demonstrate. The same person controls all of the
entities (domestic and foreign). Actions and intent are easy to document. In a fourth, V
R 50/09, a criminal conviction for fraud is already in hand. The taxpayer’s argument in
these cases is that the tax evasion is foreign (not German), so there should be no German
penalty. “R” resolves this issue against the taxpayer, and the civil courts now follow suit.
V R 3/10 places the other knowledge pole in the ground. In V R 3/10 there is
objective evidence of fraud, however evidence of fraud (without more) is not sufficient.
In this case the supplier is honestly deceived by his buyer. The supplier does engage in a
transaction that contributes to a fraud, but it is a fraud about which he has no knowledge
and no means of knowing anything about. The zero-rate cannot be denied.
V R 46/10 is the case in the middle. V R 46/10 demonstrates the impact of a
Member State “impos[ing] other obligations which they deem necessary to ensure the
correct collection of VAT” under Article 273. In this case the taxpayer ignores a large
number of “other obligations.” It becomes apparent that the taxpayer is not acting as a
reasonable businessman. He is negligent. These violations allow the conclusion that he
should have known that his contemplated transactions were connected with fraudulent
avoidance of VAT. The zero-rate is denied.
The double tax element in the six cases. None of the six cases consider actual or
potential double taxation following from the denial of the zero-rate. Double taxation
does not seem to be an important issue for the Bundesfinanzhoft. One can imagine that
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the foreign tax authorities would not overlook the chance of making an assessment on
vehicles that are fraudulently sold VAT-free within their Member State. The assessment
will be relatively easy if the vehicle identification number can be secured from the
German audit.
In V R 28/10 luxury cars are being delivered to Italian final consumers without
VAT. In V R 46/10 expensive cars are being delivered VAT-free to Italy, but to a
different (unidentified) buyer.92 V R 50/09 is based on criminal confessions. In this case
over €1.9 billion in luxury automobiles are sold to Italian consumers without VAT during
a four year period.93 V R 19/10 involves an elaborate multi-corporate structure for
securing cars for French and Dutch consumers VAT-free through a Spanish buffer. Both
Spanish and French authorities are involved in the investigation, and they most likely
have made claims for lost VAT at the time of the German hearing.
The new mutual assistance procedures under Council Directive 2010/24 makes it
much easier for jurisdictions where VAT has been lost to identify foreign businesses and
individuals who owe or are responsible for tax losses. This was one of the operating
premises of the Perfect Storm. Access to information, enforcement cooperation and
pursuit of inter-jurisdictional claims are much easier now.94 The discussion in that
paper under the heading “KITTEL STAGE 3 – the search for assets” suggests that just
such a dynamic is likely.95 The six German cases discussed herein indicate that this
process is well along its way to fulfillment.
The Perfect Storm proposes that the EU’s fight against missing trader fraud is
entering a new phase. Similar arguments are being made in two realms. Arguments
based in a trader’s knowledge of supplier (or supply chain) fraud (Kittel/Ricolta and
Mahagében/Dávid) are being replicated in arguments based in a trader’s knowledge of
customer (or customer chain) fraud (“R” and V R 46/10). The battleground is over how
much should a trader know and how much should he be held accountable for. The actual
knowledge question is answered. Actual knowledge that supplier or a customer is using a
transaction to evade tax will result in the loss of input deductions or the zero-rate on
intra-community supplies.
SUMMARY OF THE SIX GERMAN CASES
No.
1

Case No. Trial date
Summary
VR 28/10 2-17-11
A German resident establishes
three Italian trading companies
(missing traders), is appointed
their agent, and secures luxury
cars for Italian individuals.

Type
Chain
fraud
model96

92

Supra note 48, at ¶2.
Supra note 66.
94
Ainsworth, The Perfect Storm, supra note 16, at 855-57.
95
Id., at 861-62.
96
Supra note 19.
93
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2

VR 30/10 2-17-11

3

VR 46/10 5-12-11

4

VR 50/09 8-11-11

5

VR 3/10

6

8-11-11

VR 19/10 8-11-11

Carousel fraud in cell phones
moving primarily between
Germany and Austria, but with
some Italian involvement.
Italian business that does not sell
cars purchases from German
dealer. Numerous documentation
problems [receipt on different
letterhead, vague destination,
invoice does not explain VAT
omission].
Prior criminal confession. €1.9m
4 year fraud. Cars invoiced to
import traders (missing traders),
delivered to Italian businesses.
Spanish dealer purchases cars,
effects transport, but delivers to
French end customers directly.
Cars re-sold before pick-up.
German dealer unaware.
Elaborate GmbH, BV and SARL
structure secured French & Dutch
final consumers for cars bought
from GmbH through Spanish
dealer on behalf of SARL.

Carousel

Actual

Fake
Purchase
Invoice97
(possibly)

Should
have
known

Chain
fraud
model

Actual

Fake
triangular
operation

No
knowledge

98

Multiple
buffer
model99

97

Supra note 22.
Supra note 20.
99
Supra note 21.
98
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